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OPTIONS TO BUY AND LEASE LAND 
AND THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Introduction
Does the rule against perpetuities apply to options to buy or lease 
land, and if so to wiiat extent? If it does applv, is there any way of 
circumventing the rule? And what remedies, if anv, are available to 
enforce an option that may in terms be exercised after the expiration 
of the perpetuity period? These are the types of questions that it 
is proposed to examine in this article.
The rule against perpetuities, as is well known, is one of the more 
recent of the many rules developed by the law to prevent property 
from being indefinitely tied up and removed from commerce. The 
rule may be simply stated by saying that a perpetuity is void ab initio 
but this is none too helpful unless an adequate definition of a perpe­
tuity can be found. Such a definition, including all necessary aspects, 
is difficult to formulate, but perhaps the best is the following given 
by Lewis in his work on perpetuities:
“In other words, a perpetuity is a future limitation whether 
executory or by way of remainder and jof either real or 
personal property, which is not to vest till after the expiration 
of, or will not necessarily vest within, the period prescribed 
by law for the creation of future estates and interests; and 
which is not destructible by the persons for the time being 
entitled to the property subject to the future limitation, 
except with the concurrence of the individual interested 
under that limitation.” i
It needs to be added that the period prescribed by the law is the period 
of an ascertained life or lives in being and twenty-one years, or if no 
lives are mentioned in the limitation, a period of twenty-one years 
only.2
The ordinar/ option to buy or lease land is an offer by its owner 
to sell or lease the land to another for a named consideration within 
a short period of time, usually a few months. Because of the short 
period during which such options are operative, the rule against perpe­
tuities in no way affects them. An inexpertly drawn option may, how­
ever, fail to state a time limit for its operation, but apart from this 
there are several not uncommon uses of options that merit examination 
with relation to the rule. For instance, an option in terms perpetual 
or for an indefinite period sometimes appears in a conveyance of land
1. Q uoted w ith  approval by  Je s s e l, M. R ., in London and South W estern Railw ay  
C om pany v. Gom m , (1881-2) 20 Ch. 562, a t pp. 581-2.
2. T h is  is o f co u rse th e m odern ru le  ag ain st p erp etu ities  fin a lly  settled  by th e  H ouse 
o f L o rd s in  C adell v. P alm er, (1833) 1 C l. & F . 372; 6 E . R . 956; th e  old ru le  ag ain st 
p e rp etu ities  is now  u su ally  re ferre d  to  as th e ru le  in W hitby v. M itchell, (1890 ) 44 
Ch. 85; in  th is a r t ic le , th ere fo re , th e m odern ru le  is s im ply  ca lled  th e ru le  ag ain st 
p e rp etu ities.
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wheie the grantor desires to restrain the purchaser from alienating the 
land or to retain the power of getting the land baclT at a future time 
if he chooses to do so. More commonly an option that may operate 
at a time beyond the perpetuity period appears in a lease. Options for 
renewal in long term leases and perpetual renewal clauses immediately 
come to mind in this connection. Less frequently, but by no means 
rarely, one of the clauses of a long term lease wilf give the lessee the 
option to purchase the freehold during the term of the lease or a re­
newal thereof. This last type of option may take the form of an offer 
to sell for a named consideration or a consideration based on market 
value where the lessor has no objection to selling for such a considera­
tion. It will take the form of a right of pre-emption where the lessor 
does not wish to be bound to sell for a named consideration, or at all, 
but the lessee is desirous of having the first opportunity of buying if 
the lessor ever seeks to sell.
In examining the effect of the rule against perpetuities on an 
option, different matters will have to be taken into account according 
to the nature of the rights sought to be given under the option and the 
document in which it is found. Thus different questions have arisen 
in this connection in relation to options intended to create contractual 
obligations only and options intended to run with land only and those 
with both these ends in view. Further, options in leases give rise to 
special problems that merit separate consideration. For these reasons 
it has been found convenient to deal with the subject under the follow­
ing headings:
(a) Options creating contractual obligations only; *
(b) Options purporting to bind the land;
(c) Options purporting to create contractual obligations and
also to bind the land;
(d) Options in leases.
Options Creating Contractual Obligations Only
It is settled law that the rule against perpetuities is concerned 
with property, not with contract.3 A contract giving rights upon the 
occurrence of a contingent event that may arise after the expiration of 
the perpetuity period will be upheld even when the contract relates to 
property.4 An optionee may, therefore, obtain specific performance 
of an option created by a contract so long as the optionor retains the 
land, notwithstanding that the option may in terms be capable of 
operating at a remote time .5 And damages for breach of contract may 
in any case be awarded if the optionor is unwilling or unable to fulfill
3. Walsh v. S ecre tary  of S ta te  for India, (1863) 10 H. L . C. 367: 11 E. R. 1068;
W it ham v. V ane, H883) Challis on R eal P ro p erty . 2nd Ed ., App. V. p. 401.
4 W lth»m  v. V ane, (1883> Challis on Real P ro p e rty , 2nd Ed ., App. V . p. 401: 
London and Sooth W estern R ailw ay C om pany y. Gom m , (1881-2) Ch. 562 per K a y ,  
J . .  a t d. 575 and Jessel, M. R ., a*, p. 580; W orthing C orporation v. H eather, 119061 2 
Ch 532, H atton  v. W atllng, 11948] Ch. 26.
5. H utton v. W ailing, [1948] Ch. 26.
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his obligations under the option.'5 Further, it was held in one case 
that an optionee could obtain an injunction against a third party who 
interfered with his rights under a long term contract giving him a right 
of “first refusal.”7 It is submitted also that a person knowingly inter­
fering with such an option might lay himself open to an action in tort 
for inducing a breach of contract notwithstanding the fact that rights 
under it might be exercised at a remote time.
It can be seen, then, that an optionee has many remedies available 
to him to enforce long term options created by contract. W hat is 
more, these contractual rights may, it is submitted, be assigned volun­
tarily in the same way as other contractual rights and involuntarily by 
death or bankruptcy. And they may be enforced not only against the 
optionor himself but also against his personal representatives and 
beneficiaries8 and his trustees in bankruptcy.”
But notwithstanding the existence of these many remedies, the 
fact remains that once an optionor has disposed of land subject to an 
option that is a mere contract, the optionee loses his right to have the 
land conveyed to him and must content himself with an action for dam­
ages. It is usual, therefore, to insert a clause for the purpose of making 
tne option bind the land, and it is to options intended to bind the land 
that we must now turn our attention.
Options Purporting to Bind the Land
An option to purchase or lease land for a named consideration 
may, if it is framed so as to enure to the benefit of, and to be binding 
upon the heirs, successors and assigns of the parties, amount to an 
interest in land, and that interest is subject to the rule against perpe­
tuities. The leading case on this point is London and South Western 
Railway Com pany v. G om m ,10 the facts of which, in so far as they 
are relevant here, are as follows. By deed dated August 10, 1865, the 
plaintiff company conveyed lands no longer needed by it to one, 
Powell, for a consideration of £100, and Powell covenanted with the 
company that he, his heirs or assigns would, at any time thereafter 
when the lands might be required by the company for its railwav 
works and whenever so requested by the company and on receiving 
£100, reconvey the land to the company. In 1879 the defendant 
purchased the land from Powell with notice of the covenant. 
The following year the company gave the defendant notice to reconvey 
tne land pursuant to the covenant, and upon his refusal to do so, 
brought an action for specific performance of the covenant. Kav, J., 
who heard the case, held that tne option did not amount to an interest 
in land so the rule against perpetuities had no application, and he
6. W orthing C orporation ▼. H eather. [1906 ] 2 Ch. 532.
7. M ancheater Ship C anal Com pany v. M anchester R aceco u rse C om pany, (19011 2 Ch.
a t p. 51.
8. W orthing C orporation v. H eather, (1906) 2 Ch. 532.
9. B o i 's n d ’s T rustee v. Steel B roth ers & Co.. Lim ited, ( 1 9 1 1  1 Ch. 279.
10. il881 -2 t Ch. 562.
12 U. N. B. LAW  JOURNAL
decreed specific performance on a ground that will be discussed later. 
The Court of Appeal (Jessel, M .R., Sir James Hannen and Lindlev, 
L. J.) reversed Kay J.’s ruling on this question. Jessel, M . R., had 
this to say:
“If then the rule as to remoteness applies to a covenant of 
this nature, this covenant clearly is bad as extending beyond 
the period allowed by the rule. Whether the rule applies 
or not depends upon this as it appears to me, does or does 
not the covenant give an interest in land? If it is a bare or 
mere personal contract it is of course not obnoxious to the 
rule, but in that case it is impossible to see how the present 
Appellant can be bound. He did not enter the contract, 
but is only a purchaser from P ow ell who did. If it is a mere 
personal contract it cannot be enforced against the assignee.
Therefore the company must admit that it somehow binds 
the land. But if it binds the land it creates an equitable 
interest in the land. The right to call for a conveyance of the 
land is an equitable interest or equitable estate. In the 
ordinary case of a contract for purchase there is no doubt 
about this, and an option for repurchase is not different in 
its nature. A person exercising the option has to do two 
things, he has to give notice of his intention to purchase, and 
to pay the purchase' money; but as far as the inan who is liable 
to convey is concerned, his estate or interest is taken away 
from him without his consent, and the right to take it away 
being vested in another, the covenant giving the option must 
give that other an interest in the land.
It appears to me therefore that this covenant plainly gives 
the company an interest in the land, and as regards remote­
ness there is no distinction that I know of (unless the case 
falls within one of the recognized exceptions, such as chari­
ties) between one kind of equitable interest and another kind 
of equitable interest. In all cases they must take effect as 
against the owners of the land within a prescribed period.
So too, an option in a conveyance giving the heirs of the grantor 
an option of obtaining a lease of part of the land conveved after the 
expiration of a ninety-nine year lease has been held void for remote­
ness.12
The cases respecting the right of pre-emption are not so straight­
forward. Thus Fry, J., in Birmingham Canal Com pany v. Cartw right13 
thought the rule was inapplicable because it was possible for 
all the parties interested in the land to dispose of it absolutely, but 
this reasoning was rejected in the Gomm  case and Fry, J .’s judg­
ment overruled.14 In M anchester Ship Canal Com pany v. M anchester 
Racecourse Companv,15 Farwell, J., interpreted an inartistically framed 
right of “first refusal’’ purporting to be Dinding on the heirs and as­
signs of the parties that appeared in a contract validated by statute
11. Ibid., a t pp. 580-1.
12. Hope v. The M ayor, A lderm en and Cltlxens of the C ity of G loaeeater, (1855) 7 De G ., 
M. &. G. 647 ; 44 E . R . 252.
13. (1879) 11 Ch. 421, a t pp. 432-3. ’
14. (1881-2 ) 20 Ch. 562, a t pp. 572-3, 582 and 588.
15. [1900 ] 2 Ch. 352; [1901] 2 Ch. 37.
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as a right of pre-emption, which he believed fell within the reasoning 
of the Gomm  case and therefore amounted to an interest in land,16 but 
the Court of Appeal (Rigby, Vaughan Williams and Stirling, L.JJ.) 
did not think this right of first refusal was an interest in land.17 Sub­
sequently, it was held by Sutherland, J., in an Ontario ea se ,United Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Volcanic Oil and Gas Co.,ls that a perpetual right of 
pre-emption to a profit a prendre was an interest in land but was void 
Decause of its perpetual nature.
It is submitted that the decision in the Volcanic case correctly 
expresses the law; that the right of pre-emption is an interest in land 
and that interest is subject to the rule against perpetuities. Any other 
view would demand that one draw a distinction between an ordinary 
option and a right of pre-emption or question the correctness of the 
Gomm  case ana the many cases that nave followed it. Though the 
events bringing the rights into operation are somewhat different, there 
appears to be no valid reason for considering options and rights of pre­
emption as interests of a different nature. And it seems inconceivable 
that a long established case like the Gomm  case, decided as it was by 
a strong court, should ever be overruled, especially since it meets a 
commercial need.19 Had the court in the M anchester Canal case 
intended to cast doubt upon such an important decision, it would, it 
is suggested, have done so in unmistakeable terms. The remark in the 
M anchester Canal case must be regarded in the light of the peculiar 
facts of the case, which turned upon the construction of a contract 
that the court might well have held void for uncertainty had it not 
been declared by statute “to be valid and binding upon the parties 
thereto.”
In an effort to validate the option in the Gomm  case notwith­
standing the perpetuity rule, Kay, J., had interpreted it as a covenant 
running with the land under the doctrine set forth in Tulk v. 
M oxha i,20 and decreed specific performance of the option on that 
ground, but his judgment was set aside by the Court of Appeal on the 
ground that the doctrine applies to restrictive, not positive, covenants. 
The reasoning of the Court of Appeal does not appear to extend to the 
right of pre-emption, which is in substance a negative contract.21 The 
right of pre-emption would, however, appear to fall outside the 
doctrine in Tulk v. M oxhay  for another reason. In Noble and Wolf
16. [1900 ] 2 Ch. 352, a t pp. 363, 366.
17. [1901] 2 Ch. 37, a t p. 50.
18. 11911-2) 3 O. W. N. 93; see also R utherford  v. Rlspln, [19261 4 D. L  R. 822; 59 O. L . R.
506
19. Som e w riters have questioned w h eth er an option is an interest in land; the  
question has been discussed in « 18951 39 Sol. J .  618; (1896) 15 C. L. T. 218; (1898) 
42 Sol. J .  628; 11915) 35 C. L . T . 798; (1916) 36 C. L. T. 446; (1918) 38 C. L. T. 
242. 322; but none have questioned th a t if it is an interest in land, the rule against  
perpetuities applies to  it. A n option does not app ear to be an interest in land in 
the United S tates but the co u rts h av e found oth er rem edies to p revent th ird  
p arties from  acquiring rights to iand su b ject to an option: 66 C. J .  406» 7, 493-4.
20. (1848 ) 2 P h . 774; 41 E . R. 1143.
21. See M anchester Ship C anal C om pany v. M anchester R acecourse C om pany, [1901] 2 
Ch. 37, w here a righ t of first refu sal w as held to be a negative co n tract.
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v. Alley et a/,22 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the doctrine 
is concerned with user of land, not with alienation.
One other question that may possibly be raised is whether an 
option might not, in a proper case, be considered as a vendor-purchaser 
covenant, the benefit or which (though not the burden) runs with the 
land, for these covenants are not affected by the rule against perpe­
tuities.23 But in the rare case where such a contention could be made, 
it is suggested that it could be successfully resisted, if the reasoning 
in connection with related doctrines may be applied here, on the 
ground that an option does not “touch arid concern the land/'24
Options Purporting to Create Contractual Obligations 
and also to Bind the Land
W e have seen that the rule against perpetuities applies to options 
purporting to bind the land but not to options that are enforceable 
merely as contracts. Now some options are contracts only, and not 
interests in land, and some options tnat are interests in land arise under 
transactions other than contracts, such as, for instance, wills. But 
most options by far are interests in land that are the creatures of con­
tracts. It remains to be seen, then, whether options that are void as 
interests in land may not be enforced by means of contractual remedies. 
In dealing with this problem, the judges have found themselves faced 
with two separate difficulties. One was that they were accustomed 
to view the law of land and the law of contracts as logic-tight com­
partments, a counterpart of the view taken of the law of contract and 
the law of torts before Donoghue v. Stevenson ,25 The second dif­
ficulty is that in enforcing a contract that creates an option that is 
obnoxious to the perpetuity rule, the courts appear to dc enforcing 
indirectly an interest that tney have declared void.
Dicta in some earlier cases would lead to the belief that con­
tractual remedies are unavailable to enforce options that amount to 
interests in land that are void for remoteness. Thus Kay, J., in the 
Gomm  case, apparently affected by the first of the difficulties men­
tioned in the last paragraph, found it necessary to decide that the 
option in that case was not an interest in land before he would decree 
specific performance of it.26 And Warrington, J., in W oodall v. 
C l i f t o n makes remarks that might lead to a similar conclusion. T he 
matter came up for decision in the case of Worthing Corporation v. 
H eather.2* In that case an action was brought against the estate of
22. [1951] 1 D. L .R . 321.
13. P e r  B rou gham , L . C ., in K eppell v. B ailey , (1834) 2 M y. Si K . 517, a t p. 578; 39 
E . R. 1042, a t p. 1046.
24. N cbie and Wolf v. A lley, [1951] 1 D. L. R. 321 as to  re s tr ic t iv e  co v en a n ts ; W oodall v. 
C lifton, [1905 ] 2 Ch. 257 as to  co v en an ts  in leases.
25. 11932] A. C. 562.
26. London and Sonth W estern R ailw ay Com pany v. G om m , (1881-2) 20 Ch. 562 a t pp.
575 - 6.
27. [1905 ] 2 Ch. 257, a t p. 261.
28. [1906 ] 2 Ch. »32.
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an optionor for specific performance of an option providing that at 
any time during tne currency of a thirty year lease, the optionor, her 
heirs or assigns would, on receiving notice of the plaintiffs’ desire to 
purchase the land subject to the lease, convey the land to them for 
£1325. The plaintiffs further prayed that if specific performance could 
not be granted, damages should be given. During the course of the 
argument, the plaintiffs admitted that since the option created an in­
terest in land that was void for perpetuities, specific performance 
could not be granted, but they persisted in their demand for damages 
for breach of contract. The defendants argued that the option was 
not a mere personal contract but gave an interest in land that was 
void under tne rule against perpetuities. The rule, they contended, 
was based 011 public policy and a contract opposed to public policv 
was illegal. If therefore tne court enforced tne interest indirectly bv 
awarding damages it would, they averred, be giving effect to an illegal 
contract. Warrington, J., who heard the case, stated that the Gomm  
case and W oodall v. Clifton showed that specific performance could 
not be given, as was admitted by the plaintiffs, and confined his judg­
ment largely to the action for breach of contract. That action, he 
believed, could not be defeated on the ground of illegality. It was 
only the equitable interest in land that was void. This prevented the 
enforcement of the option by the supplementary remedies evolved 
by equity to give effect to equitable interests, but there was nothing to 
compel the court to consider the option merely as creating an equitable 
interest. In enforcing the contract, a court of law was not doing 
indirectly what it would not do directly; the defendants were not 
compelled to convey the land though they might find it advantageous 
to do so. The judge therefore awarded damages for breach of contract.
The decision to award damages in Worthing Corporation v. 
H eather did not escape criticism,29 but without going into the techni­
calities of the problem it may be said that it is one thing for the law 
to devise rules preventing the tying up of property in perpetuity but it 
is quite another for it to become a destroyer of bargains. Further, a 
contract such as that which existed in Witham v. I ane ,30 though not 
creating an interest in land, would certainly inhibit alienation but it 
was enforced by the House of Lords. W hy should the law treat the 
matter differently 011 the technical ground that an interest in land is 
created?
Warrington, J ’s view, based on an admission of counsel, that 
specific performance of an option that offended the rule against perpe­
tuities would not be given, even as between the original parties or 
their representatives, was not questioned for many years. Objection 
to this view might well have been taken in R ider v. Ford,31 in 1923 but 
counsel conceded the point. That such a concession should have been
29. See <19071 51 Sol. J .  648, 669; (1909 » 29 C .L .T . 759; C heshire's M odern R eal P ro p erty , 
(1944 ) 5th Ed ., p. 492.
30. (1883) Challls on R eal P ro p erty . 2nd Ed ., App. V, p. 401.
31. (19231 1 Ch. 541.
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made is surprising in the light of the decision in South East Railway v. 
Associated Portland Cement M anufacturers L im ited ,32 decided in 1909. 
That case, it is true, was not concerned with options but the 
reasoning upon which it proceeded was clearly applicable. The right 
in auestion was one to make a tunnel through the plaintiff company’s 
land at a time to be selected by the grantee. This right is capable of 
being considered as an easement and was so regarded by tne trial 
judge, Swinfen-Eady, J., but his judgment as well as those of the 
Court of Appeal (Cozens Hardy, M. R., Fletcher Moulton and Farwell, 
L .JJ.) also proceeded on the basis that the right was a future interest. 
All the judges were agreed that the rule against perpetuities has no­
thing to do with an action based on a contract between the original 
parties, but applied only when the action was based on an interest in 
land. W e may quote nere from the judgment of Farwell, J. Having 
first stated that “It is settled beyond argument that an agreement mere­
ly personal not creating an interest in land is not within the rule against 
perpetuities,” he later continued:
“But the fact that there is some connection with or reference 
to land does not make a personal contract by A. less a 
personal contract binding on him, with all the remedies aris­
ing thereout, unless the Court can by construction turn it 
from a personal contract into a limitation of land, and a 
lim itation o f land only. As regards the original covenantor it 
may be both; he may have attempted both to limit the estate, 
which may be bad for perpetuity, and he may have entered into 
a personal covenant which is binding on him because the rule 
against perpetuities has no application to such a covenant.
The real answer to the argument founded on the inconven­
ience of tying up land is that the action upon the covenant 
sounds in damages only unless the defendant has still got the 
land to which the covenant relates. If he has still the land, 
then in an action on the covenant the plaintiff may claim 
specific perform ance..............”33
The application to options of the principles enunciated in the 
Portland Cement case came up for consideration in 1947 in Hutton v. 
Watling .34 In that case the original optionee brought action against 
the original optionor to enforce an option that was perpetual in terms. 
T he optionor pleaded, inter alia, the rule against perpetuities, and on 
this occasion there was no admission by the plaintiff that the rule pre­
vented him from obtaining specific performance. The agreement was 
rather poorly drawn up and it is difficult to say whether the option 
was intended to be a personal obligation only or to create an interest 
in land. But Jenkins, J., who heard the case, found it unnecessary to 
express any opinion on this point. He was bound, he said, by the 
Portland Cement case and held the option specifically enforceable 
whether or not it created an interest in land. Here, in part, is what he 
said:
32. [1910] 1 Ch. 12.
33. Ibid ., a t pp. 33-4 ; (italics m in e).
34. [1948] Ch. 26.
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“The Associated Portland Cement M anufacturers ease there­
fore. appears to me to provide elear authority, which is. of 
course, binding on me. to the effect that an option to pur­
chase land without limit as regards time is specifically en­
forceable as a matter of personal contract against the original 
grantor of the option, and that the rule against perpetuities 
has 110 rele\ance to such a case, as distinct from a case in 
which such an is «ought to be enforced against some
successor in title of the original grantor, not by virtue of any 
contractual obligation on the part of the successor in title, 
but by virtue of the equitable interest in land conferred on 
the grantee by the option agreement.”33
Then having referred to doubts regarding the principles upon which 
he was acting in certain well known textbooks,38 he explained the 
basis upon which specific performance could be given in such a case in 
clear terms, as follows:
“These doubts appear to me to be ill founded, as 1 under­
stand the jurisdiction to grant specific performance of a con­
tract for the sale of land to be founded not on the equitable 
interest in the land which the contract is regarded as con­
ferring upon the purchaser, but on the simple ground 
that damages will not afford an adequate remedy; in other 
words, specific performance is merely an equitable mode of 
enforcing a personal obligation with which the rule against 
perpetuities has nothing to do.”37
It has now been decided, therefore, that as between the original 
parties specific performance or damages may be given of an option in 
a contract that amounts to an interest in land that is obnoxious to the 
rule against perpetuities, unless it appears that the option was intended 
to confer an interest in land only. Such an intent, it is suggested, 
would have to be clearly shown to resist an action on this ground, 
for most options created by contract are certainly intended to bind the 
original parties personally. Nor should it be forgotten that third parties 
may to a considerable extent partake of the benefits of contractual 
remedies by virtue of assignments, powers of attorney and other de­
vices, not to mention death or bankruptcy. And to a lesser extent too, 
the burden of an option mav fall to De performed by a person other 
than the original party, as occurred in Worthing Corporation v. 
H eather where damages were awarded against the executor and de­
visees of the original party.
The advantages of options that are interests in land over options 
that are contracts are that the right to have them specifically enforced 
is not so perishable and they are more easily assignable. The advant­
age of the option as a contract is that it is not limited as to time. The 
advantage of the contract over the interest may not be unimportant 
where both parties, or at least the optionor, are corporations, tor the
35. Ibid., a t pp. 3 5 - 6 .
36. W illiam s on V endors and P u rch asers , 4th Ed .. p. 424, n. ( 1 ) ;  G ray on P erpetu ities, 
4th Ed .. pp. 366-7.
37. [ 1948 I Ch. 26, a t p 36; it is in teresting to note th at the case w as appealed but not on
this point: (1948) Ch. 398, a t p. 400; for criticism s of the case, see (1948) 12 C on­
v eyan cer (N. S .) 258.
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optionor may continue in being and be capable of being sued long 
after the expiration of the perpetuity period. In such a case, it should 
be possible to have the benefit of an interest in land for as long as the 
perpetuity period will allow and the benefit of the contractual remed­
ies in perpetuity. This can be done by an agreement giving in one 
clause an option to the land binding on the parties, their heirs and 
assigns for tne period of a named life or lives in being and twenty-one 
years, and in another clause, not expressed to be binding on the heirs 
and assigns, giving a perpetual option to the land not sold under the 
previous clause. Such an agreement will go a long way towards cir­
cumventing the rule, and more can perhaps be done by contracts call­
ing for options that are interests in lana to be given from time to 
time.38
Options in Leases
As was said above, there are a number of matters peculiar to 
options in leases that merit separate consideration. One of these con­
cerns the option for renewal, which is, of course, the option most com­
monly found in leases. Though, as we have seen, an independent 
option to obtain a lease is subject to the rule against perpetuities, the 
option for renewal in a lease has long been treated as an exception to 
the rule.39 This is so even when the option is one for perpetual re­
newal,40 though the courts will lean against construing such an option 
as perpetual.41 And the renewal called for need not be in the same 
terms as the original lease for the exception to apply,42 but it must 
actually be a renewal —  the exception will not be extended to closely 
related cases,43 though the fact that the language used is not that of a 
renewal will not prevent an option from falling within the exception 
if it is truly a renewal.44 Some attempt has been made to find a rea­
son in principle for the exception by saying that the renewal forms 
part of the original estate of the tenant but the true reason for the 
exception appears to be that it was developed long before the perpe­
tuity rule.45
In addition to an option for renewal, it is not uncommon, as was 
mentioned before, for an option to purchase the freehold to be in­
serted in a lease. W here tne lease is for a term of over twenty-one 
years, the possible conflict of the option with the rule against perpe
38. Su ch  devices w ould not app ear to  co n stitu te  void restrain ts on alienation  if th ey  
do not im m ediately  crea te  interests in lan d ; as early  as Coke it w as said : “ If th e  
feofee be bound in bond, th a t the feofee o r his heiress shall n o t a lien , th is is good  
for he m ay notw ithstan ding alien if he w ill forfeit his bond th a t he him self h a th  
m ad e.” Co L itt. 206b; see. how ever, T . C yprian W illiam s In (1907) 51 Sol. J .  648. 889.
39 F o rn iv a ! v. C rew , (1744 ) 3 A tk . 83; 26 E .R . 851;W oodall ▼. C lifton, (1905) 2 Ch. 257.
40. B ridges v. H itchcock . (1715) 5 B ro . P . C. 6 ; 2 E .R . 498.
41. B ay n h am  v. G ay 's  H ospital, (1796 ) 3 Ves. 295; 30 E .R . 1019.
42. R ider v. F ord . [1923] 1 Ch. 541.
43. M uller v. T raf ford, [1901] 1 Ch. 54.
44. R ider v. F ord . [1923] 1 Ch. 541.
45. See M uller v. T rafford . [1901] 1 Ch. 54. at p. 61; W oodall v. C lifton, [1905 ] 2 Ch. 251, 
a t pp. 265, 279.
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tuities is immediately apparent. Sucn a situation arose in U’oodaU v. 
Clifton .46 There a lease for ninety-nine years contained a proviso that 
if the lessee, his heirs or assigns should at any time during the term 
be desirous of purchasing the ree simple of the land or any part thereof 
at the rate of L500 per acre, the lessor, his heirs or assigns would, on 
receipt of the purchase money, execute a conveyance of the land in 
favour of the lessee, his heirs and assigns. The plaintiff, an assignee of 
the original lessee, claimed the benefit of the option. There were two 
possible grounds on which he could do this. One was that the option 
amounted to an interest in land, but the trial judge, Warrington, J., 
(and apparently the Court of Appeal also— Romer, Vaughan Williams 
and Stirling, L.JJ.) had no difficulty in rejecting the plaintiff’s claim 
on this ground; following the Govim  case he held that the option was 
obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities and so void. Tne second 
ground upon which the plaintiff sought to justify his claim is one that 
is peculiar to leases; this ground was that the option was a covenant 
running with the land by virtue of the statute 32 Henry V III , Cap. 32, 
and to support this contention cases dealing with options for renewal 
were citea. T o  this Warrington, J., said that whether or not the 
option was a covenant running with the land, the rule against perpe­
tuities applied to it. The Court of Appeal’s reason for rejecting tne 
contention was that the option was not a covenant running with the 
land under the statute,47 and it treated the rule respecting covenants for 
renewal, as Warrington, J., had done in the court below, as an anomaly.
The application of the rule against perpetuities to options in 
leases, where the term alone does not exceed the perpetuity period 
but the term if continued may, poses somewhat subtle problems. In 
the first place, if nothing is said in a lease about renewal and a 
tenant stays on the land after the expiration of the term, a tenancy 
from year to year, from month to month or from week to week is 
created which may last forever unless terminated by the parties. This 
straightforward situation will not cause difficulty so far as perpetuities 
are concerned because it has been held that an option to purchase is 
collateral to the relationship of landlord and tenant and will not be 
incorporated as part of a tenancy from year to year created by the 
tenant’s holding over after the expiration of the original term.48 The 
option may, however, be so worded as to operate not only during the 
term but also during any continuation thereof. A situation o f  this 
kind arose in Auld v. S cales,*9 decided in 1947 by the Supreme Court 
of Canada. There the tenancy from year to year arose under an ex­
press provision in the lease but this in no way affects the principle 
upon which the case was decided. The relevant facts for our purposes 
are as follows. A lease, dated August 1, 1926, by which the lessor 
leased land to the lessee for a term of ten years “provided . . . that at
46. 119051 2 Ch. 257; see also T e rm e r  t . The K ing, [19301 E x . C.R. 178.
47. In the U nited S tates an option to pu rchase in a lease has been held to run with  
the land: 35 C .J . 1039; in England and in this co u n try  W oodall v. Clifton has 
generally  been app roved ; see, how ever, <1911> 31 C. L . T . 367.
48. Re Leeds and Batley B rew eries , and B rad b u ry ’s Lease, B radbu ry  v. G rlm ble, 119201
2 Ch. 548; T orm ey ▼. The K ing, [19301 E x . C.R. 178.
49. [19471 S. C. R. 543.
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the expiration of the ten year term . . . this demise and everything 
herein shall at the option of the . . . lessee continue as a demise . . . 
from year to year . . .  at the same . . . rent . . . and subject to the same 
terms and conditions.” The lease also contained a clause giving the 
lessee an option to purchase the freehold “at all times during the con­
tinuance of the . . . term or the continuation thereof . . The Court 
held that after the expiration of the ten year term the lease was one 
from year to year which could be terminated at any time by the lessor, 
and that the rule against perpetuities has no application to such a case. 
The following passage from the judgment or Kellock, J., (giving the 
judgment of himself, Chief Justice Rinfret and Taschereau, J.) sets 
out the reasoning of the court respecting the question of perpetuities:
“It is next contended that the terms of the lease with respect 
to the option offend the rule against perpetuities as the 
option, like all other terms of the lease, ‘shall respectively 
enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the parties 
hereto, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, 
respectively.’
"It is said on behalf of the respondent that a tenancy from 
year to year, unless terminated by notice, is capable of going 
on indefinitely, and that consequently, as the period of time 
which was set for the operation of the option here in question 
was entirely indefinite it is void.”
The learned judge then not*ed Jessel, M . R .’s approval in the Gomm  
case of the definition of a perpetuity given at tne beginning of this 
article, and after quoting tnat definition with the following words 
italicized: “and which is not destructible by the persons for tne time 
being entitled to the property subject to the future limitation,” he 
continued:
"Applying the above to the case at bar, it is clear in my 
opinion, that the option to purchase does not offend against 
the rule. ‘The person for the time being entitled to the 
property subject to the future limitation,' namely, the re­
spondent as owner, may destroy the option by terminating the 
lease by due notice in accordance with the relevant law with­
out ‘the concurrence of the individual interested under that 
limitation,’ namely, the appellant or those claiming under 
him.”50
Rand and Estey, JJ., gave similar opinions on this point.
Thusfar in our examination of the effect of the perpetuity rule 
on an option to purchase contained in a lease where the tenancy con­
tinues after the expiration of the term, we have focussed our attention 
mainly on the situation where the tenancy continues by virtue of the 
tenant’s holding over after the expiration of the term. W e must now 
take a closer look at the situation where the tenancy continues by 
virtue of a covenant for renewal. The option or the renewal clause 
may, of course, be so worded that the option operates only during the
50. Ibid ., a t p. 549.
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original term.51 But what of the case \\here an option that is an 
interest in land or a renewal clause is so worded that the option is to 
continue during the renewal or renewals? Authority on the question 
seems lacking and it raises problems that are both numerous and 
complex. The following remarks are, therefore, intended rather to 
indicate some of these problems and a few of the avenues that must 
be explored in attempting to solve them than to suggest any definite 
conclusions. Different considerations may possibly apply to the case 
where the option is expressed to continue during the term and its 
renewal than to the case where the option is expressed to continue 
during the term only but the scope of the renewal clause is such that 
it includes the option. Far more may depend upon the nature of the 
renewal clause. That clause may come into operation at the option 
of the lessor or the lessee,52 or either or both of them; or it may call 
for automatic renewal of the lease unless one or other of the parties 
gives a notice of termination. Each of these situations may give rise 
to different problems, but one of the crucial matters, it is suggested, 
is whether or not the renewal clause can operate without tne con­
currence of the lessor. If such concurrence is necessary', a strong 
argument can be made that the rule against perpetuities is not in­
fringed because the lessor has it within his power to prevent the 
option from operating for longer than the perpetuity period. The 
situation is not exactly parallel to that in Auld v. Scalcs. In that case 
the facts were, and the Supreme Court of Canada based its decision on 
the ground that the lessor had the power to cancel the lease and there­
by revoke the option at any time, whereas here the lessor has but one 
opportunity to cancel the option —  at the expiration of the original 
term. But it should be noted that in Auld v. Scales there was a period 
during which the option would be operative without the consent of 
the lessor, namely, the period between the issuance of a notice of 
termination and tne time when it took effect. If, on the other hand, 
the renewal clause may operate without the concurrence of the lessor 
and the original term when added to the renewed term or terms to­
gether exceed the perpetuity period, it can certainly be argued, in the 
words of the definition of a perpetuity above given, that this is from 
the beginning “a future limitation . . . which will not necessarily vest 
within the period . . ., and which is not destructible by the persons 
for the time being entitled to the property subject to tne limitation, 
except with the concurrence of the individual interested under the 
limitation,” and is therefore void. But against this, may it not be con­
tended. especiallv where the option is expressed to run for the term only, 
that the renewai clause can only be enforced in so far as the option is
51. Som e diet» In Sherw ood v. T u ck er, [19241 2 Ch. 440, a t pp. 444, 447 seem  to  suggest 
th a t an option  to  p u rch ase, be in g  co lla tera l to  th e re la tio n sh ip  of landlord  and te n ­
an t, th e  ren ew al w ould h av e to  c le a rly  in d ica te  its in clu sio n  to  m ak e it a c lau se  of 
th e new  te n a n c y ; th e case  d ea lt w ith  an in d epen d en t ag re em e n t to ex ten d  th e lease, 
not a ren ew al clau se .
52. A nd in th is  co n n ectio n  it should b e  rem em b ered  th a t If th e  ren ew al c lau se  does not 
s ta te  a t w hose option  It is e x e rc isa b le , it is a t  th e  option  o f th e lesse e : Lew is v. 
Stephenson, (1898] 67 L . J .  (Q .B .) 296.
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conccrned (such option being collateral to the relationship of land­
lord and tenant) as a contract, and that, therefore, the option is a 
valid interest in land during the term and the renewal clause a mere 
contractual right to give a new option that is an interest in land at the 
expiration of the original term?
The answers to questions such as those set forth in the preceding 
paragraph will, in a proper case, tax the ingenuity of counsel and judges. 
But the problem facing the solicitor may be not so much to find 
answers to these questions as to devise means of preventing them 
from arising. A practical solution to most cases tnat are likely to 
arise may be founa by providing that the option is to continue during 
the term of the lease and its renewal unless that exceeds the period or 
a named life or lives in being and twenty-one years, in which case the 
option is to continue during the period of that life or lives in being 
and twenty-one years. Such a limitation cannot be void for exceeding 
the perpetuity period, yet the lessor will be certain that the option will 
not De exercisable after the termination of the tenancy. This device 
will not afford a complete solution if the option is contained in a lease 
for a very long term or one that is perpetually renewable, but the 
existence of an option in such a lease seems unlikely to arise in prac­
tice. If it ever did, other means to re-enforce the limitation could be 
found, such as, for instance, a clause creating a contractual obligation 
upon the lessor to give new options from time to time enuring to the 
benefit of and binding upon tne parties, their heirs and assigns.
Summary
An option to purchase or lease land or a right of pre-emption to 
land may be simply a contract, in which case tne rule against perpe­
tuities has no application to it. On the other hand, an option to pur­
chase or lease land may create an equitable interest in land which 
vests on the exercise of the option and upon payment of the purchase 
price therein set out. The right of pre-emption would appear capable 
of creating a similar interest, thougn the optionee can only call for 
a conveyance when the optionor is willing to sell at a given price to a 
third party. T o  an interest in land so created, the rule against perpe­
tuities applies, and therefore if the option is capable of being exercised 
after the expiration of the perpetuity period, it is void ab initio 
as an interest in land. But its invalidity as an interest in land will not 
interfere with its enforceability' by means of contractual remedies if 
it is, as is usually the case, a contract also. And by a judicious use in 
an agreement of clauses creating interests in land and clauses creating 
contractual obligations only, a solicitor can do much to avoid the 
rigours of the rule.
An option, it appears, will not be construed as a covenant running 
with the land either at law or in equity, so no evasion of the rule 
against perpetuities is possible by this means. There is one exception 
to this. An option in a lease for the renewal of the term runs with
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the land and may be exercised, notwithstanding that its operation may 
be postponed to a remote period, by assignees of the lessee against as­
signees of the lessor, and this is so even i f  such option is one for perpe­
tual renewal. This exception will not be extended and does not apply 
to options to purchase tne freehold that are frequently found in leases. 
In practice, it is usually possible to prevent conflict with the rule by 
limiting the operation of such options to purchase for the lesser of two 
alternative periods, one being tne term of the lease (and its renewal 
or renewals if applicable) ana the other a period allowed by the rule. 
Simply because a tenancy may continue as one from year to year after 
the expiration of a lease will not cause an option to purchase contain­
ed in the lease to be void for perpetuities even if the option is intend­
ed to continue during such tenancy. More difficult problems will arise 
when, by virtue of a renewal clause in a lease containing an option to 
purchase, a new term or terms may be created which with the original 
term may continue for a period longer than is allowed by the rule. 
W ithout hazarding a guess as to what the solution to any of these 
problems may be, it is submitted that much may depend on whether 
or not the renewal may be exercised without the concurrence of the 
lessor.53
G . V . La Forest, B .C .L. (U.N.B.) M.A. (Oxon.)
Lancaster, New Brunswick
53. S in ce  th is  a rt ic le  w as w ritten  Re Albay R ealty  Lim ited and D nfferln -Law rence D e­
v elop m en ts Lim ited has b een  re p o rte d : {18561 2 D .L .R  604: [1956] O. W. N. 302. In  
th a t  case . G a le , J . ,  h eld  in an  o ra l ju d g m e n t in  th e  O n tario  H igh C o u rt th a t a rig h t 
o f  f irs t re fu sa l, u n lim ited  in  tim e, w as in v alid  as be tw een  assign ees o f th e  orig in a l 
p arties . T h e  d ecision  is u n d ou b ted ly  c o rre c t bu t th e reason s fo r ju d g m en t a re  ra th e r  
co n fu sin g . F o r  in sta n ce , a fte r  h old in g  th a t th e  rig h t w as a person al one, th e learn ed  
ju d g e  co n tin u es  by  say in g  th a t  in ad d ition  it  o ffen d ed  th e  ru le  ag ain st p erp etu ities. H e 
m ay , h o w ev er, h ave m ean t th a t if  h e  w as m istak en  in  hold ing th a t th e rig h t w as a p er­
son al o n e , th en  It w as void as o ffen d in g  th e  ru le . T h e  case  gives som e support for view s 
ex p resse d  in  th e  a r t ic le  re la tin g  to  v en d o r-p u rch ase r co v en an ts and th e assign ab ility  o f 
o p tion s th a t  a re  co n tra c ts  o nly .
T h is  a r t ic le  a ttem p ts  to  s ta te  th e  law , n o t to  c r itic iz e  it ; fo r w eigh ty  cr itic ism s and 
su g g estio n s fo r  re fo rm , see W. B a rto n  L e a ch , “P e rp e tu it ie s : S tay in g  th e S lau g h ter o f th e 
In n o c e n ts ” in  (1952) 68 L .Q .R . 35 a t  pp. 53-55 and 59.
